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Challenges of the International Investment Arbitration-Influence of the Achmea Case
*Shin-Ying (Chloe) Tsai
1

Introduction
The European Court of Justice (hereinafter “CJEU”) rendered it landmarking decision on

the Achmea Case (hereinafter “Achmea-CJEU”) in May 2018, rattling the investment arbitration
world. Looking back one year after the case was initially rendered, the dust set off by AchmeaCJEU still has not settled and has continued to influence the investment arbitration regime in
various degree and perspective. The stakeholders of Achmea include: non-EU States, EU Member
States, European Commission, investors, domestic courts, and the tribunals constituted under
intra-EU BITs.1
The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to analyze the ex-ante and ex-post effects of Achmea,
to achieve two goals. First, to ensure the legality of Achmea-CJEU, by applying Achmea under
international law. Second, the effect of Achmea and the EC termination policy of intra-EU BITs.
To achieve these goals, this paper will discuss whether the judgment of Achmea-CJEU has
correctly applied the applicable law agreed by the bilateral investment treaties (hereinafter
“BIT.”) The Achmea-CJEU arbitrarily decided the case over European Union (hereinafter “EU”)
law, based on threefold (1)dissimilatory between EU Member; (2)conflict of EU Law and
substantive standards in the BIT, and (3) the existence of a parallel system of adjudication that

1

Deyan Dragiev, 2018 In Review: The Achmea Decision and Its Reverberations in the World of Arbitration,
KLUWER (Jan. 16, 2019), available at http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/01/16/2018-in-rev
iew-the-achmea-decision-and-its-reverberations-in-the-world-of-arbitration/.
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threatens the control of European Union.2 The Achmea-CJEU decision was particularly silent on
the application of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaty (hereinafter “VCLT”)3 and
the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (hereinafter
“New York Convention.”)4
This paper will further analyze and provide further suggestions on the rights and
obligations of relevant parties, based on recent decisions of tribunals, the court set aside awards
and enforcement requests, with stakeholders including investor-states, investors with claims
arising within intra-EU BITs with relevant clauses. Due to research limitation, Energy Charter
Treaty (hereinafter “ECT”) will be referred to but will not be part of the main discussion of this
paper.5
Some figures over the intra-EU BITs is helpful to understand who the potential stakeholders
are post-Achmea. There are in total 174 intra-EU BITs cases (before July 2018), which amounts to
20 percent of all ISDS cases around the world. The typical repeat players as a defendant are
Spain (40 cases), Czech-Republic (30 cases) and Poland (19 cases) against investors from the
Netherlands, Germany, and Luxembourg.6 As EC has correctly provided in its EC-Declaration,
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Ursula Kriebaum, The Fate of Intra-EU BITs from an Investment Law and Public International Law Perspec
tive, 2015 ELTE L.J. 27, available at https://eltelawjournal.hu/fate-intra-eu-bits-investment-law-public-int
ernational-law-perspective/.
United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United Nations, Treaty Seri
es, vol. 1155, p. 331.
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 UST 2
517, 330 UNTS 3.
Declaration of the Representative of the Governments of the Member States of 15 January 2019 on th
e Legal Consequences of the Judgment of the Court of Justice in Achmea and on Investment Protecti
on in the European Union (hereinafter “EC-Declaration”)¶1(Jan. 15, 2019), available at https://ec.europ
a.eu/info/sites/info/files/business_economy_euro/banking_and_finance/documents/190117-bilateral-inve
stment-treaties_en.pdf (EC found the arbitration clause in the Energy Charter Treaty was also incomp
atible with EU law and thus the arbitration clause may not be raised); See Communication“ Protectio
n of intra-EU investment” adopted by the Commission on 19 July 2018 (Com (2081)547 final) ¶3-4.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Prosperity for All (hereinafter “UNCTAD”), F
2

95 percent of the intra-EU cases were based on BITs signed either in the 1990s or earlier. There
are 83 intra-EU cases pending (before July 2018).7 European Commission (hereinafter “EC”) has
rendered a declaration to suggest Member States provide tribunals and courts of ongoing cases
of Achmea-CJEU decision in persuasion to set aside or to rule in favor of the Member State.8
2

History of EU Law and Investment Arbitration Law-Stirring Toward Nationalism
EC back in 2006 had shown signs of unfavorable position toward intra-EU investments

when for the first time it recommended Member States to terminate intra-EU BITs.9 Historically,
the intra-EU BITs were mainly agreed by the Member States in the 1990s to reassure investors
who were wary of the investment environment based on historical political reasons. When more
States joined during the enlargement of EU around 2000, the discussion over the difference of
each State’s intra-EU BITs was left out of the picture.
Now, EC is concerned that the intra-EU BITs is challenging the solidarity of the EU, the
forum-shopping of investors, and the discrimination based on nationality in BIT awards. Most
important of all, the notion behind EC’s action is EU as a single market the EU law should have
hierarchy over BITs which contains investor-state dispute settlement (hereinafter “ISDS”) that
could render contradictory decision to the EU law. EC claims the intra-EU BITs sets a parallel

7
8

9

act Sheet on Intra-European Union Investor-State Arbitration Cases (Dec. 2018), available at https://unctad.
org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2018d7_en.pdf.
Id.
Declaration of the Representative of the Governments of the Member States of 15 January 2019 on th
e Legal Consequences of the Judgment of the Court of Justice in Achmea and on Investment Protecti
on in the European Union ¶1 (Jan. 15, 2019), available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/bu
siness_economy_euro/banking_and_finance/documents/190117-bilateral-investment-treaties_en.pdf.
Damon Vis-Dunbar, EU Member States reject the call to terminate intra-EU bilateral investment treaties, IIS
D (2009), available at https://www.iisd.org/itn/2009/02/10/eu-member-states-reject-the-call-to-terminateintra-eu-bilateral-investment-treaties/.
3

treaty system overlapping with the Single Market Rule.10 However, this concept of termination
was quickly rejected by most of the Member States that wished to maintain the existing intraEU BITs mechanism.11
A few States have terminated their intra-EU BITs, such as Italy (2012), Ireland (2013) and
Romania (2017). Later on, EC continued to request Member States to bring their intra-EU BIT to
an end, by initiating infringement proceedings against certain Member States, but EC’s effort
was in vain.12 EC further raised these concerns and tested the argument in the Eastern Suger v.
Czech Republic brought under the Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT.13 The Tribunal rejected EC’s
reasoning finding it was neither clear nor binding.14
Achmea was the perfect opportunity EC was waiting for.15 Swiftly after the Achmea-CJEU
judgment, EC finally reached consensus among the EU members that all Intra-EU BIT shall be
terminated before Dec. 6, 2019. The overall position of EC and the decision of CJEU shows signs
of nationalism to the EU investment arbitration regime. EC’s strategy over the intra-EU BIT on
its face would only affect the EU investors. However, the ripple effect of the judgment was EC
also had urged tribunals and domestic courts outside the EU to rule in favor of the EU Member
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Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council- Protection of intr
a-EU Investment, COM (2018) 547 final ¶2, 19.7.2018, available at http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/reg
doc/rep/1/2018/EN/COM-2018-547-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF.
VIS-DUNBAR, supra note 9; Christophe von Krause, The European Commission’s Opposition To Intra-EU B
ITs And Its Impact On Investment Arbitration, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Sep. 2010), available at http:/
/arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2010/09/28/the-european-commissions-opposition-to-intra-eu-bitsand-its-impact-on-investment-arbitration/.
EC, Commission asks Member States to terminate their intra-EU bilateral investment treaties (June 2015), ava
ilable at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5198_en.htm
See Letter of the European Commission, Internal Market and Services of 13 January 2006 quoted in Eastern
Sugar B.V. v. Czech Republic, Partial Award ¶24-26 (2007); Eureko BV (The Netherlands) v. The Slov
ak Republic, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension ¶ 180-82 (2010).
KRAUSE, supra note 11.
DRAGIEV, supra note 1.
4

States.

3

The Achmea Case - From the Start
Achmea went through several stages within different legal systems. Starting from the

tribunal of Permanent Court of Arbitration (hereinafter “PCA”) in 2010 16 to the Frankfurt
Higher Regional Court17 and Federal Court of Germany18, and finally working its way up to the
CJEU.19
3.1

UNCITRAL Arbitral Awards Based on ISDS

The dispute started from Achmea B.V. (originally Eureka), a Dutch company against
Slovakia under UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and administered by PCA in 2010 based on the
1991 Netherlands-Slovakia BIT. 20 Achmea B.V. provided insurance products via subsidiary
starting from 2004 to Slovakia, but only to find in 2006 the change of power in government
reversed the original liberalized health insurance market. The seat of arbitration was set in
Germany. The tribunal dismissed the argument of EU that if the same subject would be
regulated by the EU law and the decision of a tribunal under the BIT, EU law would prevail.
The tribunal understood this argument to mean that it only had jurisdiction to rule on the breach
of non-EU law of the Slovak Republic (host state in Achema).21

16

17
18
19

20
21

Achmea B.V. (formerly Eureko B.V.) v. The Slovak Republic (I) (PCA Case No. 2008-13), Award on J
urisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension (Oct. 2010).
Frankfurt Higher Regional Court, Decision, Case 26 Sch 3/13, (Dec. 18, 2014).
German Federal Court of Justice, Decision, Case I ZB 2/15 (Oct. 31, 2018).
Slowakische Republik (Slovak Republic) v. Achmea BV, Court of Justice of the European Union, Judg
ment, Case C-284/16 ¶101 (Mar. 6, 2018).
Id.
Achmea B.V. (formerly Eureko B.V.) v. The Slovak Republic (I) (PCA Case No. 2008-13), Award on J
urisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension ¶274 (Oct. 2010).
5

The tribunal emphasized that nothing in the Netherlands-Slovakia BIT was actually in direct
conflict with the EU law, and the award itself had nothing to bear upon any questions of EU
law.22 The tribunal continued to find that the Netherland-Slovakia BIT was not terminated in
accordance with Art. 59 of the VCLT because (1) notification was not provided; (2) the successive
treaty does not relate to the same subject-matter as the entire BIT and Art. 59 of VCLT requires
a broad incompatibility between the two treaties in question; and (3) the investors right to bring
UNCITRAL arbitration proceedings cannot be equated simply with the legal right to bring legal
proceedings before the national courts of the Host State. 23 Furthermore, the tribunal stated
CJEU has no interpretative monopoly on EU law rather CJEU only has a monopoly on the final
and authoritative interpretation of EU law. The fact that at the merits stage, the tribunal might
have to consider and apply provisions of EU law does not deprive the tribunal of jurisdiction.
Eventually, the tribunal issued an award in favor of the investor Achmea B.V. in 2012 and
ordered Slovakia to pay damages to Achmea B.V.
3.2

Decision of the Federal Court of Germany

Slovakia quickly sought to set aside the award in the Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt
(hereinafter “Achmea-Frankfurt”), based on the same point provided by EC, that the
Netherlands- Slovakia BIT was contrary to the law of the Treaty of the Function of European
Union (hereinafter “TFEU”). Achmea-Frankfurt upheld the Arbitral Award. Slovakia further

22
23

Id., at 276.
Slowakische Republik (Slovak Republic) v. Achmea BV, Court of Justice of the European Union, Judg
ment, Case C-284/16 (Mar. 6, 2018).
6

appealed to the Federal Court of Germany which submitted a request for preliminary ruling of
the CJEU and decided to stay the case until the CEJU made further decision.
From the reference of Achmea-CJEU judgment, it showed that the Federal Court of Germany
made a preliminary analysis before sending the question for CJEU to decide. The Federal Court
of Germany found the EC’s interpretation of Art. 344 of TFEU would make the NetherlandsSlovakia BIT dispute resolution clause without any meaning, for the investors would not be able
to bring dispute anywhere in the EU.24 Furthermore, Art. 344 of TFEU could not be understood
to give EU courts hierarchy over dispute resolution venues decided by parties but should be
understood as securing the autonomy of EU laws when Member States were to bring claim
under the EU courts.25 On the issue of TFEU Art. 267, the Federal Court further provided that
Art. 267 cannot be interpreted to preclude arbitration clauses in the intra-EU BITs. It further
offered an alternative route. If EC was concern over the uniformity of EU law, it could be
ensured by requesting the domestic court of Member State to review the compatibility of the
TEU law before enforcement. If the award were to be in contrast with EU law, the courts could
set aside the award on the ground enforcement would be against public policy.26
A year before CJEU made an official decision, the Advocate General (hereinafter “AG”) of
CJEU Melchior Wathelet, against the contention of Slovakia in Achmea, found the intra-EU BITs
were compatible with the EU law and do not contrast the Art. 267 & 344 of TFEU.27 Despite the

24

25
26
27

Id., at 17 (Mar. 6, 2018) (“The Treaties make no provision for any judicial procedure in which an inv
estor such as Achmea can bring a claim, before the EU judicature”)
Id.
Id., at 20.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION (ANDREA GATTINI ET AL. ED.)
, BRILL NIJHOFF 79-80 (2018).
7

support of the AG, things quickly turned in the opposite direction.
3.3

Judgment of CJEU and Compliance of the Federal Court of Germany

Differing with the opinion of the CJEU AG, the Achmea-CJEU found the arbitration clause in
the Netherlands-Slovkia BIT to be incompatible with TFEU because it adversely affected the
autonomy of EU law.28 Achmea-CJEU answered the preliminary question of the Federal Court
of Germany, respectively, but without much clarity. It relied heavily on the facial interpretation
of the TFEU and EC Opinion 2/13 that the autonomy of EU law should be protected. AchmeaCJEU further implied in several places in its judgment that the EU law has the hierarchy over
international law, as provided:
[A]ccording to settled case-law of the Court, the autonomy of EU law with respect both to
the law of the Member States and to international law is justified by the essential
characteristics of the EU and its law, relating in particular to the constitutional structure
of the EU and the very nature of that law[…]

Achmea-CJEU also stated in another paragraph, that “[a]ccording to settled case-law of
the Court, an international agreement cannot affect the allocation of powers fixed by the Treaties
or, consequently, the autonomy of the EU legal system, observance of which is ensured by the
Court…”29
Further in response to the Federal Court of Germany’s questions and proposed solutions to
TFEU Art. 267, Achmea-CJEU first found a tribunal constituted under Art. 8 of the BIT was not a

28
29

Slowakische Republik (Slovak Republic) v. Achmea BV, Court of Justice of the European Union, Judg
ment, Case C-284/16 ¶19 (Mar. 6, 2018).
Id., at 32-35.
8

Member State tribunal or legal venue, and could, therefore, rule freely in contrast with EU law.30
Other concerns of Achmea-CJEU were the award of the tribunal was final,31 and the tribunal was
to freely choose the seat of arbitration, implying the tribunal had the power to choose the law
that reviewed the validity of the award, and referring the decision was basically out of the
control of EU.32 As for the review of the award via Member State’s domestic court Achmea-CJEU
simply found the domestic court’s reviews are limited without providing much explanation.33
A few month later, on October 2018, the Federal Court of Germany referring to the CJEU’s
decision verbatim set aside the final award of Achmea holding there is no valid arbitration
agreement between the parties based on the Netherlands-Slovakia BIT.

34

The main question from hindsight, therefore, turns to under which applicable law did the
CJEU judgment concluded that there is no valid arbitration agreement, and if applying
international law analysis to the case, would the decision be any different of the CJEU. The
tribunal did try to answer this question initially in the arbitral award. It stated that EU law may
have a bearing upon the scope of rights and obligations under the BIT by virtue of its role as
part of the applicable law under BIT Article 8(6) and German law as the lex loci arbitri, but further
stated that it is a question for the merits stage, not a question that goes to jurisdiction.35
3.3.1 Autonomy and Supremacy of EU Law-the CJEU Judgment in 2018

30
31
32
33
34
35

Id., at 49-50.
Id., at 51.
Id.
Id., at 53.
Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof), Decision, Case I ZB 2/15 (Mar. 3, 2016).
Slowakische Republik (Slovak Republic) v. Achmea BV, Court of Justice of the European Union, Judg
ment, Case C-284/16 (Mar. 6, 2018).
9

Two rules under the fundamental law of EU – the TFEU Art. 344 and Art. 267 were claimed
to be violated. TFEU Art. 344 concerns EU Member States shall be prohibited from submitting
disputes concerning the interpretation and application of EU law (emphasis added) to dispute
settlement mechanism other than those provided straightly in EU founding treaties. Therefore,
first, the PCA tribunal did not qualify as court or tribunal of a Member State (emphasis added) under
pursuant to Art. 267 of the TFEU. The primary purpose was to ensure the autonomy and
supremacy of EU law.36
Reviewing Achmea-CJEU’s argument, it stated that the PCA tribunal could interpret the EU
law on possible infringement of BIT and subject to limited judicial review by EU Member State
domestic courts. 37 Moreover, the investment arbitration interpretation could threaten the
application of EU law and have an adverse effect on the autonomy of the uniform and
effectiveness of EU law,38 which are enshrined in Art. 267 and 344 of the TFEU.39 Since on the
first tier, the CJEU found the context of the BIT itself was a violation of the EU law, therefore
was no discussion over the non-discrimination principle.40
There are many perspectives when referring to the autonomy of EU law. The EU law has
both external autonomy (the relationship between EU law and international law), and internal
autonomy, which is the relationship between EU law and national law. There is also the judicial
autonomy of the EU law, which is embedded in Art. 19 of the TFEU which shows the role and

36
37
38
39
40

Id., at ¶33.
Id., at ¶50-53.
Id., at 37, 56, 58.
Id., at 59.
Florian Stefan, Brace for Impact? Examining the reach of Achmea v Slovakia (June 2018), available at http:/
/arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/06/24/brace-for-impact-examining-the-reach-of-achmea-v-slo
vakia/.
10

prerogative of the CJEU to be assigned by EU to be the sole authority to interpret EU law,
including the validity and interpretation of it.41 Under this theory, only a binding or definitive
interpretation of the EU law by the arbitral tribunal can the BITs be of violation of the EU law.
However, as provided by the Federal Court of Germany, and the PCA tribunal, the award was
never intended to interpret the EU law definitely, and even if it would wish to do so it was not
authorized under the intra-EU BIT. In any event, the domestic courts have the power to review
during enforcement of the award.
In short conclusion, CJEU by accepting EC’s argument tried to resolve the EC’s nightmare
of (1) the BITs giving legal institutions outside of EU may have the power to interpret or apply
EU law freely, and a more subtle reasoning; (2) that these legal institutions are not tribunal of an
EU member state under Art. 267 of the TFEU and thus could not request for CJEU to provide a
preliminary ruling. In sum, CJEU would not be able to adjudicate or interpret the EU law under
the intra-EU BIT. However, the main reasoning of the CJEU was straight forward more policy
and fact-driven instead of a proper legal analysis.
3.3.2 From the Lenses of International Law
There is no doubt that Achmea-CJEU judgment has been the cornerstone of investment
arbitration of 2018, but the context of the judgment has also caused considerable confusion. As

41

GENERAL INTEREST OF HOST STATES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (GIORGIO SACERDOTI ET AL. ED.),
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS 270 (2014); Opinion of the Court of 14 December 1991. - Opinion deliver
ed pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 228 (1) of the Treaty. - Draft agreement between
the Community, on the one hand, and the countries of the European Free Trade Association, on the
other, relating to the creation of the European Economic Area (hereinafter “Opinion 1/91”) (Dec. 199
1); Opinion pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU — Draft international agreement — Accession of the E
uropean Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Fr
eedoms — Compatibility of the draft agreement with the EU and FEU Treaties (hereinafter “Opinion
2/13”) (Dec. 2014).
11

the dispute aroused from a BIT between states, VCLT has set out specific rules for the
interpretation of BITs. However, the judgment was silent on this matter. 42 VCLT was not
mentioned once in the Achmea-CJEU judgment. It is impossible to rewind the time or force
explanation out of the court, but one cannot wonder if the Achmea was to be explained under
VCLT would the outcome be any different from the CJEU judgment. As the tribunal of Achmea
has correctly stated: “Whatever legal consequences may result from the application of EU law, those
consequences must be applied by this Tribunal within the framework of the rules of international law and
not in disregard of those rules.” Therefore, this paper aims to apply Achmea through the lenses of
international law.
At the first tier, the main question of Achmea remains whether Art. 8 of the NetherlandsSlovakia BIT can be interpreted as being against the autonomy of EU law. By applying VCLT to
EC’s argument, the first noticeably clause would be under Art. 27 VCLT, EC should not be able
to be shield under internal law to justify the failure of the performance of the treaty.43 The main
issue thus would be whether EU law would fall under the internal law, given EU law’s unique
characteristic.
EC had not explicitly answered to Art. 27 of VCLT, but through the implication of its
argument in the Achmea-CJEU, by EC’s wording, EU law is seen as internal law by the EU. As
mentioned by EC by referring to “autonomy of the EU legal system,” “the autonomy of EU law […]
is justified by the essential characteristics of the EU and its law, relating in particular to the

42
43

DRAGIEV, supra note 1.
VCLT Art. 27 (“A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failu
re to perform a treaty. This rule is without prejudice to article 46.“)
12

constitutional structure of the EU and the very nature of that law (emphasis added).”44
On the second tier, responding to EU’s latter argument, which was absent in court but
provided in EC-Declaration six-month after the Achmea-CJEU judgment, of raising lex posterior,
mentioning that the principle exists in customary international law, and thus, EU law succeeds
intra-EU BITs.45 There is the need to bear in mind that during Achmea-CJEU, EC’s argument was
the automatic preclusion of intra-EU BIT by contradicting EU law and thus leading to the loss
of jurisdiction by the tribunal. EC did not argue lex posterior or termination per se of the intra-EU
BIT under the rules of VCLT.
But responding to the issue under international law, by applying Art. 59 of VCLT, a treaty
shall be considered “terminated” if (1) all parties to the treaty conclude a later treaty; (2) relating
to the “same subject matter (emphasis added)”, and (3) all parties intended the matter should be
governed by the latter; or (4) the provisions of the treaties are so far “incompatible that the two
treaties are not capable of being applied at the same time (emphasis added)”. The prerequisite
requirement to raise Art. 59 of VCLT in the first place has not been met in Achmea, even if EC
intended to base its argument on Art. 59(1)(b) of VCLT that the provisions between the
Netherlands-Slovakia BIT were incompatible as to not being able to be applied at the same time.
All EU Members may have the intention to terminate intra-EU BITs, but it could be too far-fetch
to argue that the intra-EU BITs and the EU law as a whole relate to the same subject matter. This

44

45

Slowakische Republik (Slovak Republic) v. Achmea BV, Court of Justice of the European Union, Judg
ment, Case C-284/16 ¶33 (Mar. 6, 2018).
Declaration of the Representative of the Governments of the Member States of 15 January 2019 on th
e Legal Consequences of the Judgment of the Court of Justice in Achmea and on Investment Protecti
on in the European Union¶n1 (Jan. 15, 2019), available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/bu
siness_economy_euro/banking_and_finance/documents/190117-bilateral-investment-treaties_en.pdf.
13

is also supported by past awards, such as in the case of WNC Factoring Ltd. v. Czech Republic, the
tribunal decided that EU law and BITs do not have the same subject matter on the basis that EU
law does not offer equivalent procedural or substantive protections to foreign investors. For
example, the tribunal finds that freedom of establishment is not coordinate with protection from
expropriation under the BITs.46 Therefore, it would be difficult for EC to argue that EU law
should prevail under Art. 59(1) of VCLT. The same issue of having the “same subject matter”
between the and EU law would arise if EC were to argue that Art. 30 of VCLT regarding
successive treaty should apply.47
If the court were to find the Netherlands-Slovakia BIT and EU law have the same subject
matter, EC might be able to raise the argument of priority clauses. Under the NetherlandsSlovakia BIT Art. 3(5) states if the rules of other Agreement treatment are more favorable that of
the present Agreement, such rules “shall prevail over the present Agreement to the extent that is more
favorable (emphasis).” The burden would be on EC to prove that the investor protection of EC law
is more favorable.
As raised in the EC-Declaration, if EC were to successfully raise lex posterior, and passed the
“same subject matter test” under Art. 30 (1) of VCLT, since each intra-EU BITs are signed by
Member State respectively, Art. 30(3) of VCLT that regulates when parties to the later treaty (EU
law) includes all parties to the earlier (respective intra-EU BITs) would apply, and the latter

46
47

WNC Factoring Ltd. v. Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-34, Award, 298-305 (Feb. 22, 2017).
Slowakische Republik (Slovak Republic) v. Achmea BV, Court of Justice of the European Union, Judg
ment, Case C-284/16 (Mar. 6, 2018) (“[T]he tribunal found that there is no incompatibility between th
e BIT and successive treaties under Article 30 Vienna Convention where an obligation under the BIT
can be fulfilled by the host State without violating EU law”)
14

treaty will have hierarchy over the intra-EU BITs.48
Art. 54 (a) of VCLT also allows for unilateral termination by one party if stated and agreed
in the BIT drafted by the parties. Since the EC-Declaration is to terminate all Intra-EU BIT and
all member-state are in theory under the guidance of EU, and in practice, no objection of these
termination has been made. Therefore, the termination of Intra-EU BIT would fall under the
mutual termination route of VCLT instead.49 EC has been encouraging mutual termination of
the intra-EU BITs.50
In short conclusion, under the preliminary analysis of Achmea under international law, (1)
EU law as constitutional law not treaty law of EU may not invoke EU law as a reason to justify
its failure to perform under the Netherlands-Slovakia BIT (VCLT Art. 27); (2) since the EU law
and the Netherlands-Slovakia BIT does not have the “same subject matter”, EC may not contest
successive treaty (VCLT Art. 30) or termination (VCLT Art. 59) of the Netherlands-Slovakia BIT
due to factual conclusion of the latter (EU-law), and (3) the same reasoning of subject matter
applies to Art. 30(5) for the lex posterior argument.
3.4

Other Achmea Issues Raised under International Law

The primary rationale behind EC’s argument of Achmea is that there is a clash of applicable

48
49

50

VCLT Art. 30(3) (“[T]he earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible wi
th those of the latter treaty.”)
VCLT Art. 54(a) & (b) (“[T]he termination of a treaty or the withdrawal of a party may take place: (
a) in conformity with the provisions of the treaty; or (b) at any time by consent of all the parties aft
er consultation with the other contracting States.”); T. Voon & A.D. Mitchell, Denunciation, Termination
and Survival: The Interplay of Treaty Law and International Investment Law, 31 ISCID REVIEW-FILJ 413 (2
016).
See European Commission, Commission asks Member States to terminate their intra-EU bilateral investment
treaties, Press Release (18 June 2015); see also Jarrod Hepburn and Luke Eric Peterson, Stage is Set for
Infringement Proceedings over Intra-EU BITs, as Informal Process between European Commission and Three
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law and the EU law should take precedent, for, under the autonomy rule, intra-EU BITs cover
the same area of EU law (e.g., expropriation, most favored nation clause), the intra-EU BITs gives
tribunal opportunities to rule differently from the EU law and policy, and under the supremacy
of EU, this is an area EC does not want to take risk from.51 Although the Achmea-CJEU clearly
takes this point of view, the Achmea-PCA tribunal initially found that the tribunal actually
cannot derive any part of its jurisdiction or authority from EU law, because its jurisdiction is
derived from the consent of the parties to the dispute in accordance with the BIT and German
law. Thus, EU law is actually operated as between the parties as part of German law as the lex
loci arbitri. Other awards such as the case of Vattenfall v. Germany II have also discussed the clash
between EU land intra-EU BITs and found that EU law should be seen as international law
because it is rooted in international treaties.52
Another hypothesis is if, under the EC’s theory, that EU law precludes arbitration under
BITs, does the BIT become invalid? The Achmea-CJEU has failed to answer this question. In
practice, EC and EU Member States have decided to close down all intra-EU BITs altogether, but
before a legitimate termination of the BITS, EC fails to justify of its preclusion of arbitration.
On the matter of whether the Achmea-CJEU judgment would have an effect over
international commercial arbitration, under the analysis and main argument of EC, it is unlikely.
Both CJEU and EC have focused on the violation of EU law for other countries to interpret or
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apply EU law under the intra-EU BIT, which is between two states. International commercial
arbitration is contracted between two private parties, and thus does not have the same authority
as of two Member State would have. 53 There are several prior cases of intra-EU BITS that
concerns the wrestle between EU laws and BITs.54
3.5

Compliance of the Achmea-CJEU Decision to the New York Convention

Referring to the argument of EC of the need to protect EU autonomy by applying EU law
over the intra-EU BITs, shows that EC did not consider the possibility of setting aside the award
regarding intra-EU BITs based on the New York Convention to be a secure safeguard of the
autonomy of the EU legal system. Although ironically, EC managed to prevent the
continuousness of intra-EU BITs because the Federal Court of Germany took the case of Slovakia
to set aside the award.

55

Putting the EC assertion and action aside, the question is whether EC

could have alleged the defense of the violation of public policy of the Achmea Award under the
New York Convention.
Art. 5(1)(d) of the New York Convention provides a justification for the domestic court to
refuse to recognize or enforce a foreign arbitral award under its discretion to decide if the arbitral
procedure was in accordance with the agreement of parties, or absence of an agreement, the law
of the seat of arbitration. 56 Under investment arbitration, Art. 5(1)(d) of the New York
Convention, allows for EU law to be part of the applicable law, in case of dispute, either by
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virtue of express provision or implicitly. Therefore, in the course of determining the applicable
law, EC may continue to claim that since the subject matter regards intra-EU BIT, EU law is
implicitly agreed to be the applicable law by the parties. 57 However, it would seem
contradictory, for EC to contend that the arbitration provided in the Netherland-Slovakia BIT,
expressly agreed by the parties, would violate the implicit application of the EU law. This would
be the domestic court’s discretion to decide. However, the parties may not allege Art. 5(1)(d) of
the New York Convention to allege a failure to correctly apply the law chosen by the parties.
Another defense to request the domestic court to set aside an award is under Art. 5(2)(b) of
the New York Convention based on the violation of public policy of the state. This is an
argument that is more likely to succeed since the TFEU are fundamental EU constitutional
provision of the EU Member States.58 The public policy defense may be raised regardless of
whether the seat of arbitration is fixed in or outside of EU.59
3.6

The Challenge of Enforcement

After a long way through the various jurisdiction of tribunal and courts, the case is still not
settled. The issue remains in flux. Although Achmea-CJEU and the Federal Court of Germany
have cut the hope of enforcement of Achmea in EU. However, there may be a chance for Achmea
to enforce the award out-side EU, since EU law does not bind the foreign countries and thus is
less likely to follow the line of analysis provided by the Achmea-CJEU.
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application to enforce Achmea outside EU is currently unheard of. Another possible option
would be for Achmea B.V. to sell its award to third parties for enforcement, but Achmea is
currently a high-risk case. It would be hard for Achmea B.V. to find a buyer
Intra-EU BIT related arbitration awards beside Achmea, on the other hand, have been
finding their way in foreign courts. Cases regarding similar Achmea clauses in intra-EU BIT are
brought to district courts around the world for either preliminary ruling or asserting the court
should set aside an award.61 Such as the Novenergia v. Spain case.62 Some of the other cases are
currently in the District of Columbia in the United States.63
4

Conclusion
The consequence of EC ‘s decision of going strong on nationalism and destroying all intra-

EU BITs may backlash against EU. In the real world, potential investors have halted investment
plans in the EU Member States after the Achmea case has aroused. Not to mention that existing
EU investors are advised to restructure investments through non-EU countries that have BITs
with EU Member States in order to maintain investment protection.64
In the end, the biggest issue of the Achmea series is the dispute between the two main
concepts held firmly between the tribunal and the CJEU. The tribunal applying international
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law find reasonable believe the intra-EU BIT will not harm the autonomy and supremacy of EU
law and without doubt has jurisdiction over the case. This was originally supported by the
Federal Court of Germany but was later turned around after Achmea-CJEU was rendered. CJEU
stands firm that EU law should precede in any circumstances. Therefore, those in the
international community who expected a dialogue of the application and relationship of EU law
and international law should be disappointed. In sum, this paper’s goal is to provide a clearer
picture of the clash of the two worlds of the EU and international law. In practice, CJEU decision
has more significant impact on other awards and ongoing domestic court cases. However, the
tribunal has provided international law analysis and evidence, which the CJEU has failed to
answer and justify its statements.
The future of intra-EU BIT was unrolled after EC issued a declaration in early 2019
announcing all Member States have agreed to terminate all intra-EU BIT around the end of 2019.
From this paper’s analysis, first, cases that have started before the actual date of termination of
each BIT, respectively, will still be allowed to be adjudicated. Second, the tribunals and courts
of these cases and those that are ongoing before termination will likely be influenced by
“encouragement” of EC to set-aside or adjourned because of lack of jurisdiction. Third, intra-EU
BITs with sunset clauses (e.g., the Netherland-Slovakia BIT has 15 years) are likely to be
terminated together with the BITs at the end of 2019. Fourth, although the Achmea series regards
only intra-EU BIT, however, it has been affecting similar cases under ICSID. But for
In conclusion of the Achmea series of events and other recent intra-EU BIT cases, it is clear
that EC has been steering toward nationalism since 2005 when it has actively and publicly
encouraged the termination of all intra-EU BIT in several occasion. Yet the EC-Declaration has
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stated for the Member State to provide reasonable effort to terminate their intra-EU BITs.
Therefore, whether the intra-EU line of the dispute will come to an end in the short run, remains
unanswered. Meanwhile, the initiation and development of the international investment court
that is supported by the CJEU could take over the investment dispute resolution regime. How
the two systems will interact, and which shall prevail can only be proven over time.
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